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Presidential Warfare and the “Forever Wars”
Mel Gurtov
 
Abstract: This article examines the origins and
development of the US “forever wars” in recent
decades,  and  its  implications  both  for
democracy  and  warfare.
Once upon a time, American leaders only went
to  war  when,  in  accordance  with  the
Constitution,  Congress  declared  it.  That
practice  has  long  since  been  abandoned.  In
recent  times  Congress  either  votes  to
“authorize” a war already underway or is only
casually consulted if  at all.  Though the 1993
War  Powers  Bill  was  meant  to  restrain  an
imperial president who had led the country to
defeat  in  Vietnam,  no  president  since  has
faithfully  followed  that  law’s  requirements.
Thus,  whereas  in  authoritarian  systems  the
great leader simply orders troops into action, in
democracies like ours, going to war is sneakier,
in two ways.
 
First,  in  justifications,  as  when  the
President decides to dispatch troops or
otherwise use force on the basis of his
role  as  commander-in-chief,  invoking
“national  security,”  the  “national
interest ,”  “regional  s tabi l i ty ,”
“humanitarian  intervention,”  “restoring
order,”  and other wide-open categories
that most Congress-members are loath to
challenge.
Second,  in  methods,  using  indirect
warfare, such as drones, special forces,
economic  and cyber  attacks,  sanctions,
and sabotage; and using unofficial (and
deniable) assets such as the CIA, private
company mercenaries, and third-country
partners.
 
No one understands the game better than Joe
Biden,  who  as  a  senator  had  a  consistent
record  of  opposing  the  use  of  force  without
Congressional approval.  He says he wants to
end the “forever wars” in the Middle East. As
Afghanistan shows, however, “ending” does not
actually  mean  terminating.  With  the  Taliban
now intent on overthrowing the US-supported
government,  and  many  in  Congress  already
critical of Biden’s troop withdrawal, US policy
will  actually  entail  reducing US involvement,
u s i n g  a  d i f f e r e n t  m i x  a n d  l e v e l  o f
intervention—what  he  calls  “over-the-horizon
capabilities.”  The  “forever  wars”  will  go  on,
justified  by  an  understanding  of  presidential
power that leaves enormous room for military
action even when troops are withdrawn.   
In the Middle East since the George W. Bush
administration, the legal basis for US military
involvement  has  been  Congressional
Authorizations  for  the  Use  of  Military  Force
(AUMF).  Authorizations  amount  to  blank
checks,  and  have  been  freely  exploited  by
Democratic and Republican presidents alike to
attack terrorists and unfriendly states, support
allies,  and  sustain  very  large  forces  in  the
region.  The  authorizations  are  so  expansive
that they could be used to go to war with Iran,
attack the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons
depots, protect Israel, or reintroduce forces in
and around Afghanistan. Biden says he would
like  to  revoke  the  2002  AUMF,  which  was
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directed at Iraq, and he apparently has support
in both houses of Congress to do that. But that
still  leaves  the  much  broader  2001  AUMF,
which  gives  the  president  the  power  to
"prevent  any  future  acts  of  international
terrorism  against  the  United  States."  His
capacity to deploy forces and use other assets
in the Middle East and Africa will  not be all
that constrained.*
Remember Ronald Reagan’s secret war making
in Central  America,  which culminated in  the
Iran-Contra  affair?  That  operation,  though
eventually  exposed,  demonstrated  how  a
president  determined  to  defeat  a  particular
enemy (Nicaragua) could go around Congress
and,  with the help of  dogmatic  advisers  and
secret channels, erect a sophisticated network
of  state  and  private  entities  to  fund  war
fighting.  The  Democratic  opposition  in
Congress  fought  a  rearguard  action  as  it
struggled for  legislative language that  would
tie Reagan’s hands. The lesson of Iran-Contra is
that  presidents  have  enormous  resources  at
their disposal for conducting wars. A skeptical
or hostile Congress is often playing catch-up.
Two scholars who have served in government
have  this  to  say  about  the  current  state  of
affairs with respect to restricting presidential
authority to make war:
 
To understand the limited significance of
[Biden’s] approach [on AUMFs] to ending
the forever wars, you need look no further
than  Mr.  Biden’s  Feb.  25  airstrikes  in
eastern  Syria  against  the  Iran-backed
militias  responsible  for  assaults  on  U.S.
and allied personnel in Iraq. The United
States is not at war with Syria or Iran, and
Congress had not authorized the strikes.
The president ordered them nonetheless,
based on his independent authority, under
Article II of the Constitution, “to conduct
United  States  foreign  relations  and  as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.”
Narrowing  the  2001  and  2002  [AUMFs]
would  leave  this  presidential  power
untouched.  
 
But  the  problem  goes  much  deeper  than
presidential  hubris.  Congress  may  often  be
behind  the  curve  when it  comes  to  national
security,  but  it  is  still  part  of  the  problem
rather  than  the  solution.  Bipartisanship  has
much to do with the expansion of presidential
power in national security matters. A majority
in  Congress  almost  always  rejects  efforts  to
limit  the  commander-in-chief’s  authority,  as
shown,  for  example,  during  the  Bill  Clinton
intervention in the Balkan wars of the 1990s
and the post-9/11 start of endless wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan.  Republicans and Democrats
then refused to restrain a president by recourse
to the War Powers Bill. In fact, if that bill were
up for a vote today—and two senators plan on
doing  just  that—it  probably  wouldn’t  pass,
whereas if continued direct US involvement in
Afghanistan—or  sending  troops  to  Haiti  in
order to “help restore order”—were put to a
vote, those actions probably would pass. The
reality, of course, is that a president wouldn’t
put  any  of  those  decisions  to  a  vote  by
Congress.
There are also implications here for US
relations with China and Russia, which remain
(as they were under Donald Trump) the top
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national security threats. Congress once again
is following the president’s lead, which is heavy
on ominous rhetoric and sanctions but light on
creative diplomacy. How might Congress react
if, for example, Biden were to decide (vis-à-vis
Russia) to ramp up military exercises near
Ukraine and pressure Germany to terminate
the Nord Stream gas pipeline; or (vis-à-vis
China) to walk back support of the one-China
pledge and begin US-Japan joint naval
maneuvers on China’s borders? In today’s
political climate of demonizing both Russia and
China, Congress would be reduced to an
ancillary role in what would clearly be Cold
War II. Worse yet, this abdication of
responsibility could put the world on the
threshold of a nuclear confrontation just when
common security ideas are most needed.
I  conclude  that  no  significant  inroads  in
presidential  power  in  foreign  affairs  are
possible  without  redefining  US  national
security. Foreign policy needs to be humanized
and  demilitarized;  Congress  must  resist
authorizing  poorly  defined  military  action  in
advance;  the  bloated  military  budget,  three
times  the  size  of  China’s  and  ten  times
Russia’s, must be deeply cut; the use of force
must  be  proportional  and  seldom used;  and
diplomacy must be reenergized, with an accent
on  engaging  adversaries  as  well  as  friends.
President Biden is correct to say that foreign
policy begins at home. But he must avoid the
trap  presidents  typically  fall  into—the
temptation  of  undemocratic  war  making.
 
 
*The  joint  House-Senate  resolution  in  2001
says: “That the President is authorized to use
all  necessary  and  appropriate  force  against
those  nations,  organizations,  or  persons  he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided  the  terrorist  attacks  that  occurred  on
September  11,  2001,  or  harbored  such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any  future  acts  of  international  terrorism
against  the  United  States  by  such  nations,
organizations or persons.”
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